Mathias Vermeulen: Well, first of all I think the first civilian trial which we will see in the US will be the trial of Ahmed Gilani which’s actually also suspected of having been in secret detention in Poland. And I think this will be the first test of whether the civilian court in the US are up to the depth of prosecuting detainees, which have been held in the high value secret detentions, slash Rendition Program. But I’m sure that the US course are up to the job to, the US Federal Courts are up to the job of prosecuting detainees, like they have done for the past…. past 20-30 years actually there was a very big study by Human Rights first, who have actually shown that they have… that they were at least one and fifty terrorism trials which have been completed in US Federal Courts.
Now to the issue of Khalid Szejk Mohammed. I think that we will see the hearing or the actual trial to start at the very earliest mid 2011 I think. Cause there is really like what you see happening now, it’s Galani as well who was transferred already quite some time ago from Guantanamo Bay to New York. What that you had first, lot of pre trial hearings and then the actual court date was scheduled for… is now scheduled for March 2010. And I think if we will see the (…) problems, they are actually with the case of Khalid Szejk Mohammed… it will take quite some time. And I think… Of course the trial will raise a lot if trial issues. But I think the prosecution is going to circumvents the issue of evidence which is obtained through torture, just by referring to earlier statements that Khalid Szejk Mohammed has given in an earlier stage when he has gone on out on (…) yes I’ve bombed The USS Cole, that was very happy that this all has happened. So I think they will try to avoid as much… like circumventing the all secret evidence and obtained through torture, which basically backs a question why he had been held in a secret detention centre. Such a long time of course if nothing of what has happened than is actually to be used in court. But I think he will be convicted, especially when he’ll have the jury trial. I think the biggest problem is still that you’re facing death penalty, which is highly problematic for instance for the countries of the European Union, who have to cooperate with the prosecution, to for instance sent evidence or information which (…) indicate. But the problem is if this court trial lead to a death penalty, then they are quite some problems in this regard. But.. So I think Khalid Szejk Mohammed has conviction and in 2011 then they will try to… prosecution will try to (…)
Wawrzyniec Smoczyński:Interesting enough. President Obama stunned some journalists two weeks ago by saying when he announced the fact (…)civilian court that the death penalty shouldn’t be actually a problem. And of preampting the decision of the court. I wanted to ask if there any questions from the room. And if there aren’t any at that stage Adam please.
Adam Bodnar:I have one question to… maybe two even to Mathias. Because you’ve mentioned that the part of this accountability process are different civil law sues, which are pending against also private companies or some, you know, semiprivate companies that cooperated with most probably… were some subsidiaries of CIA. And what is your opinion. Would it… What results are of those investigations in terms of clarifying. Whether those investigations could be somehow beneficial to the process of disclosing facts, seeking truth in here, in central and Eastern Europe. In terms maybe of some international flights or some cooperation with CIA. Recently I have read an article that there was some entrepreneur that was providing CIA with some, I would say, building and construction works, which were probably used in order to build some facilities. So if you could elaborate on this a little bit more.
And the second question is… because we have mentioned during the last panels that the situation in Italy which ended up with the… with the incrimination of those twenty three CIA agents and the final verdict of the court. And I am just wandering in the context of this discussion on Poland and the approach of the Polish authorities what were the preconditions… I don’t know. The situation you tell it was possible and it already seems like it is enough. And one more question to Draginja. You have mentioned that the strategy of Amnesty International here in Poland. But as far as I understand there is a part of the broader strategy of Amnesty trouble work concerning the CIA Rendition Program and you have some… Because you oversee like the whole process in the work of… explaining and seeking the truth. So if you could maybe say a little bit how your strategy here fits in the big picture of Amnesty. And second, what is your strategy as Polish section of the Amnesty International for next months, next years in the situation when it seems the polish prosecutors offices still quite silent as regards the CIA Rendition Program.
Mathias Vermeulen:O.k. Two, actually three questions maybe. The impact of the civilian trials on the events in Central and Eastern Europe. I think it is very hard to predict what… For instance I mentioned the Gilani trial and the fact that he was being held in Poland. Now what we see happening in the pretrial hearings is that the lawyers for Gilani have asked the judge to preserve all potential evidence that he was tortured in CIA black site and it also decides that search had to be kept intact, that it couldn’t be (…) by the CIA. And I don’t know if it’s surprisingly, but the US government didn’t object to this proposition. Then of course we know as well that Gilani was held in six to seven secret detention facilities, so it all depends on whether the judge will actually see that it’s relevant for the trial. That’s person asked why he was actually held in a secret detention facility. And maybe if he judges that this is the case, then (…)will emerge about when somebody was transferred or… And I wouldn’t say that this… Actually for Poland that not only civilian trials are important in this (…)like… I think the upcoming military commission trial of Mr. (…)is also… could also be quite important. Few that has happened actually in Poland. Then you mentioned the case of the contractor. These are two different things. This guy is actually already in jail and he is convicted for a fraud case. And he has given an interview to a journalist of the New York Times in which he says by the way to show how loyal he was to the CIA and to the company that actually has put him into jail. He was actually the one implementing these three secret detention facilities. He said that he has helped building one in Morocco, which was never used. He mentions that he has helped building one in the centre of Bucharest, and then he mentioned an unknown third facility, which we now are pretty sure is in Lithuania.
The second question about Abu Omar trial and its preconditions and what’s the possibility of happening this in Poland. Well I think the big difference probably is that the Abu Omar abduction was probably the sloppiness effort of CIA agents in the whole history of the Agency basically. They were like taking their wives on trips to Rome, they were using mobile phones which could be easily traced, they left traces all over the place. And then coupled with the fact that they had a very ,very good prosecutor Vataro, who really was biting into this subject and was really going against every single thing you can imagine. Because had a lot of objections of the Italian state. But he was still pushing through. And I think it’s really… really the matter of sloppiness of the CIA on Abu Omar rendition case. Also for instance that this guy was actually grabbed on the streets of Milano and brought daylight with witnesses being there. So… I mean it’s quite a big difference with very secret operations which happened later in Poland.
Draginja Nadazdin: Jeśli chodzi o Amnesty i jak nasze działania komponują się w działania międzynarodowe, jeśli chodzi o mobilizację społeczeństwa, to Amnesty na całym świecie stara się naświetlić problem Guantanomo, ale też problem wojny z terroryzmem w krajach trzecich. Pokazujemy nie tylko, co się dzieje w Unii Europejskiej, co się działo w Unii Europejskiej, ale też jak wojna z terroryzmem została wykorzystana w takich krajach jak Tunezja albo Arabia Saudyjska. W tym momencie oczywiście jak najbardziej prowadzone są samodzielne badania Amnesty International, które polegają przede wszystkim na bezpośrednim kontakcie z ludźmi, którzy sami oświadczyli właśnie naruszenia praw podczas tzw. wojny z terroryzmem. Natomiast w przypadku Unii Europejskiej, w przypadku krajów członkowskich, nasza taktyka jest dosyć podobna, tzn. jest to dosyć spójna taktyka, która skupia się na tym, żeby się domagać od państw, szczególnie od takich jak państwa unijne, które mają zapisane prawa człowieka jako jedne z podstawowych wartości, domagamy się właśnie wywiązania się z obowiązków i rozliczenia z tymi naruszeniami. Niestety, ale przykład nie jest osamotniony w krajach unijnych i w związku z tym Amnesty jeszcze w czerwcu 2008 r. wydała raport pt. „State of denial”, gdzie postawiliśmy 6 właśnie takich przypadków, które miały miejsce w Unii Europejskiej. Zaczyna się od tzw. szóstki z Bośni, czyli imigrantów z krajów islamskich, którzy przybyli do Bośni podczas wojny domowej, a którzy na początku 2002 r. zostali aresztowani przez bośniacką policję i przekazani do sił NATO, do amerykańskiej armii, która stacjonowała w bazie NATO. A potem stamtąd zostali przetransportowani do Guantanamo. Bośniacki sąd w międzyczasie już uznał, że to wszystko działo się bezprawnie, natomiast to był dopiero początek tych wydarzeń w krajach europejskich i tam, gdzie Unia Europejska miała bardzo bezpośredni wpływ, jak np. w Macedonii. I tutaj przykład Pana El-Masri, który według macedońskiej siły bezpieczeństwa był przetrzymywany kilkanaście dni w hotelu i torturowany, zanim go przekazano dalej, do Afganistanu.
Nasza taktyka, że nie będziemy robić badań wokół Kiejkut może się zmienić, jeszcze się okaże, że faktycznie Prokuratura Krajowa cały czas jest dosyć powściągliwa. Natomiast ja nie wierzę, że to długo potrwa, ponieważ faktycznie sprawy się zmieniły o tyle, że polskie władze już nie lekceważą tego problemu. Faktycznie nie ujawniają żadnych informacji , natomiast jeszcze na wiosnę 2008 r., jak byliśmy jako jedna z wielu organizacji pozarządowych na spotkaniu w Ministerstwie Spraw Zagranicznych z okazji powszechnego przeglądu okresowego, nowego mechanizmu w ramach ONZ, podczas którego państwa muszą się sprawozdawać i rozliczać z sytuacji przestrzegania praw człowieka… Jedno z pytań, które się pojawiło i na które Polska miała odpowiedzieć w ramach tego przeglądu okresowego, było pytanie o obecność tajnych więzień CIA i żeby raport, który powstał na podstawie prac parlamentarnych komisji ds. służb specjalnych został opublikowany. Przedstawiciel Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych wówczas powiedział, nie pamiętam – to było kilkanaście albo nawet dwadzieścia parę organizacji tam, na miejscu – powiedział, że jak można publikować coś takiego jak tajny raport, przecież to jest tajny raport; jeżeli w ogóle taki raport powstał, w co osobiście nie wierzy. Więc jeśli taką publiczną wypowiedź usłyszeliśmy od przedstawiciela Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych, a teraz słyszymy, że jednak śledztwo jest prowadzone i jest to bardzo ważne śledztwo, na tyle ważne, że jest objęte tajemnicą państwową, to powiedziałabym, że ten kierunek jest już diametralnie inny. I sam fakt, że śledztwo trwa już 2 lata dla nas jest już dowodem na to, że są pewne wyniki, które pozwalają na to, żeby było ono kontynuowane. Bo gdyby nie było powodów, to już by zostało umorzone.
Wawrzyniec Smoczyński:I just have a question to Vesselina Vandova. Because Mathias referred to the case of Mr. Gilani whose trial might surface of Polish participation.
Vesselina Vandova:Absolutely. He doesn’t need to be present in Poland in order to file a complaint. His lawyers can file a complaint for him.
Wawrzyniec Smoczyński: And do you actually expect an avalanche of such complaints being filed after US procedures against people following detainment in Guantanamo Bay, who will come to civilian courts?
Vesselina Vandova:I hope there will be maybe not an avalanche because all know there’re not that many. And many of them would not like to file complaints for personal reasons, for cooperative reasons.
Dorota Pudzianowska:I have a question for Vesselina Vandova. Because we were, of course, considering the possibility of filling complain in the name of victim, of person who was kept here. But as I understand… I do not know. Maybe we are mistaken in a way. There is a blockage of information from people who are now kept in prison, by Sheikh Mohammed. The lawyers can not transmit any information they get from them. So we have no information as to show probability that he was kept in Poland. So therefore it is even difficult to get a power of attorney from the guy to join the proceedings in front… which are now in Polish prosecution. Because we cannot get this document. So in a way I feel it is not that obvious that we can right now go to Strasbourg fill a case.
Vesselina Vandova:No, it’s a real difficulty. You’re right. And as you said you have to get a power of attorney, his agreement for such a case going to Strasbourg. But I would encourage you to get in touch with the lawyers for (…), maybe with the lawyers for (…)and see what they think. I mean this difficulty might lessen in the future. So it may still be possible to bring a case. Maybe not now but in some time.
Wawrzyniec Smoczyński: Any further questions?
- If I could ask you to introduce yourself. Thank you
Darian Pavli: Absolutely. I just spoke at the earlier panel. Maybe there are new people. I am with the Open Society Justice Initiative. My name is Darian Pavli. And I have been working on Rendition Program and transparency from different parts of Europe. I just wanted to follow upon this discussion. There is a… There is the whole bunch of difficulties. That I also share this optimism that things may be changing, partly as a result of the changes that the president Obama implemented. And a fact that we gonna have increasingly more public trials. But the fact remains that the attorneys for these detainees, some of them were pointed out by government, some were selected or volunteered to defend these detainees are under so called gag orders. They are prohibited from disclosing what their clients told them, including their relation to the treatment they were subjected. However the information is beginning to light. For example important information, for example some of the court submissions that papers that the attorneys for the detainees are submitting in a federal court now. And for the military tribunals are being disclosed at listening part. And for the example one quarter piece of information, that is also element of Poland, is that in a recent submission, for example for Khalid Sheikh Mohammed The lawyer indicated that…. Here is the irony. They are looking for ways to get around the gag order. So lawyer cannot say what his client told him. But he could say that the treatment which its client has been subjected is consistent with information that is already out there in the public domain. That’s not what his client told him. It is independent third party descriptions, however they came to access that information, things like that. Basically there the story out there is true. And I am sure that is the kind of thing that the Polish prosecutor are in charge of the investigation could be very keen on looking for, all right, looking into. Thanks.
Wawrzyniec Smoczyński:Thank you. There is a question from the general public.
-But I wanted to jump to this other point. As you know Guantanamo has been closed. It turns out that apparently we just gonna bring the people from Guantanamo to the United States. But one of the consequences of that, one pros, is that the normal rules which applied at least for the people who went before the civilian courts in the United States were gone. Which is you can’t prevent a lawyer from joining a defense team. You cannot (…) what the government could do in Guantanamo. And you cannot prevent the defendant from speaking publically. And would be really quite extraordinary if the government was able to drain people into the civilian court, to trial them, and prevent them from speaking. They were not able to do that in the case of Fidela, who was first held in the United States, but was able to tell his lawyers and then to testify what happened. It was irrelevant. But tomake a presentation.
Wawrzyniec Smoczyński: Thank you. Are there any further questions from the audience? Note that… I will sum up with a short. I was very surprised that two months ago when I discovered het the harshest critic of the nomination of Sonia Sotomayor on the Supreme Court Justice in the US came actually from John U., who happens to be the Chief Legal Council of the Bush administration. The chief legal architect of the whole secret detention regime. Now the senior fellow at the (…) Red Cross Institute. Now… regarding the responsibility of Polish politicians I think. It is perhaps interesting to look at that from the view point of the mechanics of Polish political life. I think at the moment we will start having trials in Strasbourg. And Polish government being forced to pay quite high contributions to people accusing Poland of secret detention, who immediately will have a politically experienced parliamentary commission which would shed more light and we need on that refer. So I’m consciously being cynical now. And cautiously optimistic in other prospects of getting to know more about who actually ordered or authorized the participation of the Polish government in the secret detention program of the CIA. For now I’d like to thank you very much for the panelists who agreed to join us and you for listening and asking questions. Thank you very much.
Adam Bodnar: Proszę Państwa, chciałbym Państwa powitać na kolejnym i ostatnim już panelu dzisiejszej konferencji. Moderatorem tego panelu jest Pan dr Piotr Kładoczny, który jest adiunktem w Instytucie Prawa Karnego Wydziału Prawa i Administracji, a od wielu lat współpracownikiem Helsińskiej Fundacji Praw Człowieka i jest koordynatorem programu interwencji prawnej Fundacji. Zgodził się moderować to ostatnie nasze popołudniowe spotkanie. Oddaję głos, Panie Doktorze.
Jak nie dopuścić do naruszeń w przyszłości? Kontrola państwowa nad działalnością służb specjalnych.
Piotr Kładoczny, adiunkt w Instytucie Prawa Karnego, WPiA UW: Bardzo dziękuję. Ja nie tylko się zgodziłem, ale to jest wielki zaszczyt i prawdziwa przyjemność w tak doskonałym gronie wybitnych fachowców siedzieć i jeszcze do tego pełnić funkcję moderatora. Chciałem przede wszystkim Państwa panelistów przywitać, w szczególności Pana dra Mortona Halperina, który przybył do nas ze Stanów Zjednoczonych i jest ekspertem do spraw polityki zagranicznej i wolności obywatelskich. Pełnił również różne funkcje w administracji prezydentów amerykańskich - Johnsona, Nixona, Clintona; obecnie jest ekspertem Open Society Institute i będzie nam na pewno mógł wiele ciekawego powiedzieć, jakie ma refleksje dotyczące tego, jak nie dopuścić w przyszłości do naruszeń, jak wygląda kontrola państwowa, jak może wyglądać – nad działalnością służb specjalnych. Myślę, że jeżeli Państwo pozwolą, to w kolejności tej, która jest przewidziana dla panelu będziemy udzielać głosu.
Oczywiście witamy również Pana prof. Jana Widackiego, który nie jest z nami ciałem, ale duszą i umysłem z całą pewnością. Kłaniam się serdecznie. Pan prof. Widacki – poseł na Sejm, ale przede wszystkim także, nie wiem, czy przede wszystkim, ale w interesującej nas kwestii można powiedzieć jest, był wiceministrem spraw wewnętrznych i rozumiem, że bezpieczeństwo państwa również jest mu bliskie i na pewno będzie mógł powiedzieć, jak to wygląda z optyki wewnętrznej państwa, taka działalność antyterrorystyczna, i jak to w przyszłości wyglądać może.
Witamy także Pana posła Józefa Piniora, który jest posłem do Parlamentu Europejskiego, ale przede wszystkim także był członkiem komisji w sprawie rzekomego wykorzystania krajów europejskich przez CIA do transportu i nielegalnego przetrzymywania więźniów. No i na końcu, choć last, but not least, Pana prof. Krzysztofa Kubiaka, prorektora Dolnośląskiej Szkoły Wyższej, eksperta ds. bezpieczeństwa i zwalczania terroryzmu, jak rozumiem – przeczytałem dobrze, jak sądzę – również komandora. I w związku z tym niewątpliwie będziemy mogli się dowiedzieć wielu różnych ciekawych rzeczy dotyczących przyszłości, również z punktu widzenia wojskowego, i historii wojskowości również. Historia daje pewien dystans do tego, co może być w przyszłości.
Proszę Państwa, witam Państwa raz jeszcze serdecznie. Czuję się zaszczycony, raz jeszcze podkreślam, oraz chciałbym przystąpić już teraz do Państwa wystąpień. Bardzo bym prosił o zabranie głosu Pana dra Mortona Halperina z uwzględnieniem wszakże tego faktu, że jesteśmy przed świętami i te prognozy chciałbym, żeby były pozytywne. Żebyśmy mogli spokojnie pójść, wrócić i święta obejść w nastroju sympatycznym i pozytywnym. Bardzo proszę.
Morton Halperin, starszy doradca Open Society Institute, ekspert ds. polityki zagranicznej i bezpieczeństwa, pełnił ważne funkcje w administracji prezydentów L. Johnsona, R. Nixona i B. Clintona:Actually I’ sorry to tell you that my role in the United States is to suggest people that Christmas (…)I’m afraid I can’t bring here any. This is a… It’s a very wide question. I haven’t prevent this again. Some of us remember the United States (…)going through the same thing time of the(...) crisis heard great deal about. Scandals of the intelligence agencies, assassinations and other things. And we vowed it will never happen again. And now something that might be potentially worse has happened. And I think there’s no easy solution to have them prevented from happening again. Or let me suggest some steps that I think need to be taken in the United States. And then we’re generally trying to make sure that it’s not going to happen again. The… I think the price to star is to say is that, I think, many of us in the United States recognize. That this is primarily(...) That is so far other governments participated in activities that they shouldn’t have participated. They did it under enormous pressure from the American government. And the demands of both secrecy and complicity and that we’re very hard to resist. And we saw the same thing within the United States. Many Americans, who should have known better. Including what we called a president nevertheless can carry the way by pressures to conform . And so the process we’re dealing with I think needs to begin in the United States. If not begin, we need to carry a heavy burden. And I think you should know that there has been a sustain that substantial effort on the way in the United States. So try to deal with the issue of American responsibility and to insist the American accountability.
There was a coalition of the major Human Rights and Civil Liberties parties in the United states ,that have been committed this for some time. Some of the(...) pressing for(...)prosecutor. Some, including the Open Society Institute, have been pressing for president to be(...) But I think that we all share the view that now withstanding president Obama is desired to look forward that the United States leaves to walk back. And the first step is for the United States to take responsibility for what it is done. Ad it’s still that those of you who have studied logic know that the third sentence follows from the first two. But it is not yet been either. President Obama has said that torture is illegal. And president Obama has said that (…) is torture. But he’s not said that the previous administration engaged in torture. And I think it’s not an accident that he’s not said that. Because I think he understands the consequence of saying. I think there is a great resistance in the United States to meeting with what is a clear international legal obligation. As he know, well established now, that States have the legal obligation to deal with impurity. And to combat impurity by taking steps when a government comes into office, face with a previous record of systematic violation of human rights. It is I think impossible any more to argue that the Obama administration did not come into office having inherited from its predecessors the policy not to set up an operation, but policy to engage in the systematic violations of International Humanitarian Law, of Rules of War and of American treaty obligations. Not to speak of the constitution of the United States. And I think this means that we need to deal this in a full and comprehensive way.
As I said, many of us have argued that the first step needs to be a comprehensive report. Because under the American system of government a criminal proceeding does not lead to the truth. It leads to a decision to(...) or not to(...) certain people. And indeed there is an infirmitive obligation of the government not to use the cohersive powers that it has in the criminal investigation for the purpose of revealing information that is not related to the guilt or innocence of(...) So may argue that what we need is a presidential commission. Commission with full access to all of the records and files of the US Government, with a mandate to report to the American people of what was done. Because the first step in a process has to be an understanding by the American public which would not believe they have of what was done. And specifics and the details and why it was done and who decided, why, when was(...)But we know a great deal. We know enough to know that there was a systematic power abusing , the systematic violations of human rights. We actually don’t know why about, how it was decided and why it was done. For example there’s a lot of people who think that people in the government are wise enough to know torture is a very good way to get people to law. Not to get them to tell the truth. And what they were in fact, these were confessions that Saddam Husain was behind line. I’ve no idea if that is true or not. But it’s certainly as reasonable(...) as (…)that we had. The hope is there is a public report. It will then lead the United States to take the other steps that needs to take. One of which is to decide who violated the criminal laws in the United States.
I think we also need to deal with the issue of reparations. It’s a very wide subject for Americans to deal with. This is different than many other situations we’ve had prove commissions. Because most of the victims were not Americans. We did manage to torture a few Americans, but most of the people being tortured were not part of our own society. And so the question of reconciliation, of compensation, of helping people recover from the consequences of being tortured. All these issues are extremely difficult. By the my view need to be faced if we are going to have done what we need to do, to make sure that this will not happen again. And then I think we need to learn a lesson that actually came out very well in query in the hearings and investigations we had at the time of the Watergate. Most(...) is known as a Church Comity(...) investigating intelligence and its abuses. It pointed out that intelligence agencies operate(...) without legal choice. That what they do is decided by the set of secret agreements between them and presidents and prime ministers and that that is the source of a great deal of the abuse. And if the Church Comity had one single recommendation, it was that war intelligence activity should be conducted (...) to(...) publicly by the Congress which provide clear guidelines as to what should be done, what should not be done. And also clear guidelines as who have had to be reported to and what for, and what was illegal and what was not illegal.
We absolutely failed to do that. We engaged over the next five or ten years in various abortive efforts to enact charges for the FBI, for the CIA, for the intelligence community as a whole. Nothing essentially came out of that. And we went into the post 9.11. period with the same secret voice about what different agencies could do and not do. Who(...) as they had before. Hopefully we will learn this lesson and we will…. Once we had a full truth before a net legislation and will make these things clear and therefore make require for these things to happen again in the future. There are some things that I think need to be done internationally. And let me suggest a few of them. When we are in the middle of this extraordinary situation, where the United States government says it can’t say where the secret sites were because it promised confidentiality to the governments that provided the secret centres. And the government providing the secret sites say they con not promise confidentiality… say that have a secret site, because they promised the Americans that they will keep it secret. And we have of course in the case that you have heard about in England. This extraordinary situation. The British court said something which no American court has said yet. I regret this. Namely information, documenting of how a person was tortured cannot be properly classified. No American court have said that. And the every American court has considered the issue. It said exactly the opposite that what can be classified depends only on the harm that will come from making it public and has nothing to do of what it’s about.
And of course since making public that we have tortured people, it is in fact in the view of the federal administration for the courts that that is probably classified. The British court has said absolutely clearly. Of course in a democratic country descriptions of torture cannot be classified. Nevertheless the British Court is still wrestling with this absurd assertion which the British and American governments have inspired to make to the court, that the United States will end its intelligence relation with the UK if the court orders this fourteenth(...) or seven paragraphs (…). And that we even failed to provide information which may have saved lives in the UK, because persons will be so troubled by this pitch of security. As if there’s never been a pitch of security in the United States. In a way it’s run they in fact abandoned all that. The wives of people in the UK. The real problem is that third parties which collaborate with both of us will not do so if these documents remain public. I assume that’s Poland., I can imagine.
I think we need to work together to brake this cycle of governments blaming on each other. I think we need to do that by trying to insist that each of our governments say we have no objection to making this public, if the other government’s involved. Or not. And try to that simple process, to try to brake through this process. I think… The other thing that’s going on we’ve been talking about today which is extraordinarily important to what was happening in the United States or so forth to what was not happening in the United States. I think I can assure you that no intelligence or other relationship will be broken by the American Government. And if another government decides that it’s all political and constitutional democratic procedures which require to admit they provided theplace for a secret prison not known by most of his political leadership. And I think it’s important that we continue (…) and broader ones, the NGOs concerned about these issues from different countries, can together to talk about what is going on (…)And I think that at the end of the day our goal should be joined clarification among democratic countries of how we should deal with the threat of terrorism. It’s worth knowing that Lithuania, which apparently also had the honor of hosting one of these secret prisons, is now the chairman of(...) Community of Democracies, a global network of democratic organizations, which in a(...) document, strangely(...) the Warsaw Declaration pledge that the countries are with… come together to fight terrorism consistent with their international legal obligations. I think we need to refer that commitment and spell at to the tails of it. What it means to combat terrorism consistent with the international legal obligations. And at the end of the day an International Union of Democratic Countries , which is in the legislation of each country in ways that we(…) is the only way to increase our confidence that this will not happen again.